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I. MOTIVATION
Profile-cast is a service paradigm within the communication
framework of delay tolerant networks (DTN)[1] Instead of
using destination addresses to determine the final destination,
the routing protocol uses a profile-based forwarding approach.
Thus, profile-cast can be considered a special case of be-
havioral networks. With the rise in popularity of various
wireless networks, the need to make wireless technologies
robust, resilient to attacks and failure becomes mandatory.
One issue that remains to be addressed in behavioral networks
is node co-operation in forwarding packets. Nodes in a be-
havioral network might behave selfishly (due to bandwidth
preservation, energy /power constraints) or maliciously by
dropping packets or not forwarding them to other nodes based
on profile similarity. These detrimental attitudes of nodes are
more prominent when each node is autonomous. In both cases
the net result is degradation in the performance of the network.
It is our goal to investigate whether and how the perfor-
mance of the behavioral network can be improved by employ-
ing self-policing scheme that would detect node misbehavior
and then decide how to tackle them in order to ensure node-
co-operation.
This will try to ensure that the overall performance does not
fall below a certain limit. We need to first determine the effect
selfish or malicious nodes have on the overall network. Various
existing self-policing techniques [2], [3], [4], which are in
use in mobile adhoc networks will be tried on the behavioral
network, using some form of simulation. Those results will
show whether these schemes are applicable in behaviriol
networks as well. If none of these approaches work adequately,
a novel scheme will be proposed to solve the problem. We
now enumerate the various challenges in applications of self-
policing techniques to behavioral networks.
1) The main problem associated with this area is the nature
of the forwarding protocol. Absolutely no information is
stored about which path the data packet took to reach
the destination. Hence it is hard to detect which node
dropped the packet.
2) Secondly The delay tolerant nature of the network,
makes it difficult to have a distributed reputation based
system [2], where each node can have tables containing
the behavior ratings of each other node.
3) As with ad-hoc networks, the nodes have bandwidth and
energy constraints.
4) Nodes might misbehave individually as well as in a
group for a collusion, thereby complicating misbehavior
detection.
II. RELATED WORK
Profile-Cast, a novel adhoc networking concept introduced
in [1], leverages the behavioral patterns of mobile network
users for delivering messages to a sub-group of users as
defined by their profiles (e.g., interest, social affiliation, etc.).
A total cooperation is needed from all the nodes in order to
maintain the overall performance of the network. If the nodes
are autonomous, they really have no incentive to cooperate,
that is, forward messages destined to other nodes, since for-
warding utilizes some physical resources (like battery power,
bandwidth, etc.) and these are generally scarce. To ensure node
co-operation it is necessary to propose some kind of incentive
scheme. As described by [5], an “Analysis” phase is needed
to design an incentive based protocol.
• Analysis: The engineer analyzes and adjusts the coop-
eration protocol that requires an incentive scheme. The
analysis phase comprises of checking what type of coop-
eration exists between the nodes in the network. Further,
the cost of such cooperation for each entity is chosen
and adjustments are made to render the behavior more
perceptible. This phase is allowed to obtain a theoretical
knowledge of what needs to be used to enhance cooper-
ation incentives among the nodes.
In the analysis phase we first should propose a trust model so
that we have a reference or starting point. Zhaoyu Liu et al. [6]
introduces a trust model for mobile ad hoc networks. Initially
each node is assigned a trust level. The nodes neighboring
to a node exhibiting suspicious behavior initiate trust reports.
These trust reports are propagated through the network using
one of our proposed methods. A source node can use the trust
levels it establishes for other nodes to evaluate the security
of routes to destination nodes. Using these trust levels as a
guide, the source node can then select a route that meets
the security requirements of the message to be transmitted.
This paper demonstrates important concepts for establishing a
collaborative, dynamic trust model and for using this model
as an example to enhance the security of message routing
in mobile ad hoc networks. Approaches to incentive scheme
include:-
1) Reputation based scheme
2) Credit Based scheme
3) Game-theoretic approach
Buchegger et al. [2] proposed a fully distributed reputation
system which make advantage of both first-hand and second-
hand reputation information. It can effectively cope with false
shared observations. In their later work, Buchegger et al.
[7] described general features and design considerations for
reputation-based self-policing techniques in mobile ad-hoc
networks. SPRITE, a simple cheat proof credit based system
was proposed by [3]. They assumed the presence of a central-
ized Credit Clearance System(CCS), which denotes credits to
individual nodes in the network. The basic philosophy remains
that whenever a node is forwarding someone else’s packet, it
is gaining some credit. On the other hand, a node, while trying
to send it’s own packet looses credit. Thus, a credit balance is
maintained so that a node is forced to forward other’s packets
in order to send it’s own. Srinivasan et al. [4] first used a
game theory based approach to ensure node co-operation in
adhoc networks by trying to optimize power of a node to
its throughput. The work is basically aimed to address the
issue of selfish nodes. Profile-Cast falls in the paradigm of
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN). Zhu et al [8] have proposed
a credit-based incentive scheme to foster co-operation among
nodes in a DTN. An incentive aware routing was proposed
for DTN networks by Upendra Shivade et al. [9], on the lines
similar to Srinivasan et al. [4] which uses pair-wise generous
tit-for-tat. Another approach based on game-theory has been
proposed by L Buttyan et al. [10] for delay tolerant networks.
Our work is different from the existing ones in the inherent
nature of the Profile Cast network, and the nature of the trust
model which we are going to build. Section III will describe
the main features of the project.
III. PROPOSED RESEARCH
A. Problem Statement
Profile-cast has two main communication modes using
behavioral profiles. One is CSI: Target mode (CSI:T) and
another is CSI: Dissemination mode (CSI:D)[1]. CSI:T can
be used when the target profile is in the same context as
the behavioral profile and CSI:D provides a more generic
option when the target profile is irrelevant to the context of
the behavioral profile. In other words, for example, if we use
mobility as the profile, nodes with similar profile tend to be
physically close to each other. However, in CSI:D, they could
be scattered in the behavioral space.
CSI:T has two main phases: a) gradient ascend phase and
b) group spread phase. In the gradient ascend phase, it sends
only one copy of the message (i.e. only one thread) which
is delivered to another node which has better profile match
with the target profile1. After that, the responsibility of further
delivering the message is given to that node. This mechanism
achieves less than 84% overhead of the delay-optimal strategy
(which generates as many copies as needed to achieve the
lowest delay for each node) without much degradation in the
delivery ratio. CSI:D attempts to send the message to the
intended receivers utilizing the small world character of the
encounter graph [1]. The sender starts as the first message
holder and then adds additional message holders who are very
dissimilar in their behavioral profiles, to achieve low coverage
1The misbehaving node might be a concern here, since this one packet
might be dropped. A better strategy to make it more robust is to forward
some more packets to a group of nodes with better profile matches
overlaps. Each message holder keeps a list of behavioral
profiles of its known other message holders.
We can see both of these mechanisms depend on certain
kind of trusts among all the nodes. A trust model for profile-
cast needs to be defined. Both CSI:T and CSI:D assume
that nodes carrying the message to the intended recipients
are trustworthy and thus will not misbehave. But in reality
some nodes may refuse to forward the packet (may be due
to physical limitations like power, bandwidth etc.). Malicious
nodes silently dropping the packet and lying about it because
they are selfish or they want to disrupt the message forwarding
mechanism. There can be individual nodes that are misbehav-
ing or can be a group of colluding nodes in-order to disrupt
the system.
In CSI:T, during the initial phase of gradient ascend, there
will be only a few nodes with low profile matching with the
target. Therefore, the sending node will have very limited
choices to select the next sender. Since the matching with
the target profile is very low, it is most likely that those
nodes will not be very trustworthy as they may not be inter-
ested/acquainted about the target profile. It is possible when
nodes with similar profile are under the same authority/interest
party. Therefore, they may not be willing to use their resource
to forward the messages from other groups. Since there are
only a small number of packets at this stage, the impact
on the delivery ratio will be significant. Similarly, in CSI:D,
new message holders are chosen from those who have very
dissimilar profiles. It may lead to selection of misbehaving
nodes as the next message holder. Note that in CSI:D there
will be multiple message holders so the impact of misbehavior
may not be as severe as in CSI:T.
We plan to address the following problems:
1) We first need to analysis how much impact will be
made on the message delivery mechanism (both for
CSI:T and CSI:D) if we introduce malicious nodes
who may misbehave either as individuals or a group.
Observations need to be made on all the evaluation
metrics before/after injecting misbehaving nodes.
2) Profile-cast when used in a Delay Tolerant Network
renders early detection of misbehavior or malicious
activities difficult because, in most of the cases, the
sender has no way to get an acknowledgement from
the receiver. Moreover, it is possible that the acknowl-
edgement itself is false because the receiving node is
malicious. Therefore, one of the main problems is how
to detect node’s misbehavior in a behavior-aware mobile
network.
3) There are a number of existing self-policing mechanisms
for both ad-hoc networks as well as DTN. Specifi-
cally, they can fall into the following classifications:
incentive/credit-based system, reputation systems and
game-theory based approaches. The problem remains to
be answered is that whether we can apply these tech-
niques directly or a hybrid approach in our scenario (e.g.
profile-cast) to achieve satisfactory results. Particularly,
if a reputation-based approach is applied, we also need
to build an efficient trust model.
4) Trustworthiness of a misbehaving node may vary de-
pending on the target profile. During gradient ascend
phase in CSI:T, a node may fall on the gradient of
multiple targeted profiles. Since we have very few
choices during this initial stage, if we try to avoid (or
blacklist) some nodes after knowing that they dropped
packets (or showed other misbehavior), the delay may
increase significantly. In the worst case, we may end up
with transmission failure due to incapability in finding
matching nodes. Moreover, misbehaving to one certain
kind of profiles may not mean that it will also misbe-
have for other profiles (for example, its own matching
profiles). Therefore, we need to make a trade-off here
between reducing the overhead and maintaining the
delivery ratio/delay bounds. It will be a major challenge
for us to incorporate all these scenarios and come up
with a novel self-policing approach for behavior-aware
networks.
B. Evaluation Metrics
The evaluation metrics we would consider including:
1) Message delivery ratio (percentage of the messages
which are received in the destination node);
2) Message transmission delay;
3) Transmission overhead (total number of messages trans-
mitted in the delivery process);
4) Storage and Computation overhead (how much interme-
diate information we need to store);
5) Detection time of misbehaving nodes.
C. Investigated Parameter Space
We will investigate parameters which can affect any of the
above mentioned evaluation metrics. In our experiments, we
plan to vary those parameters to see how the corresponding
metrics change. Specifically, the parameters and their value
spaces include (but are not limited to):
1) Percentage of misbehaving nodes in the network which
varies from 10% to 100% in one step of 10%; the
distribution can be made random or following some
statistical patterns;
2) Packet dropping probability of misbehaving nodes which
varies from 10% to 100% in one step of 10%;
3) Percentage of untrustworthy nodes in the network, if
reputation-based approach is used, which varies from
10% to 100% in one step of 10%;
4) Data-rate of each node (packets sent per second) which
varies from 1 to 10 in one step of 1;
D. Methodology
We plan to explore the impact of misbehaving nodes on
behavior-aware mobile networks, analyze the applicability
of existing techniques and evaluate the effectiveness of our
approach using simulation. Possible candidates include NS2
and GloMoSim. We may also be ready to implement our own
system prototype as well as the simulator.
E. Scenarios
Since we have real traces collected from University cam-
puses, we would focus on campus like scenarios. We can use
mobility behavior as each node’s profile. When some nodes
misbehave, they may be only interested in forwarding packets
to those nodes which have similar mobility behaviors (e.g.
student have similar course schedule) since they may have
common interests (e.g. homeworks etc.). We believe it is a
reasonable and practical scenario.
IV. MALICIOUS NODES IN PROFILE-CAST
In this section, we investigate the impact on various eval-
uation metrics from malicious nodes. First, we describe the
overflow of our work. Second, we introduce various parame-
ters that we use to model different scenarios with malicious
nodes. Finally, we show the experiment results on how mali-
cious nodes will affect the performance of profile-cast, which
motivates our approach for handling misbehaving nodes.
A. Overview
Figure 1 shows the overflow of simulating profile-cast
with malicious nodes. The mobility trace files are parsed to
generate two kind of files for each node: association matrix
and encounter traces. The former one contains the information
of each node’s association with each location during each
time unit (e.g. 1 day in our case). An entry would be, for
example, one node spends 30% of the time in the gym on
November 2nd, 2007. In other words, it describes each node’s
mobility preferences which is used as the behavioral profile
in our case. The later one stores all the encounters with other
nodes for each node. It is assumed that packet transmission
between nodes will only happen when they encounter at the
same location. In this case, it means they are associated with
the same AP. The association matrices will then go through
a singular value decomposition (SVD) process which is done
by MATLAB. The output, S and V matrices, will be used in
calculating the similarity between any pair of nodes in terms
of their behavioral profiles. The similarity information will be
used during profile-cast.
We randomly generated the target profiles of packets as
well as their sender nodes and time. The malicious node
information gives values of those parameters which will be
discussed in Section IV-B. The target profiles, malicious node
information, encounter traces along with S/V matrices are feed
into the profile-based simulator. Note that since we assume
misbehaviors will only happen during the gradient ascend
phase of profile-cast, the simulator will simulate the gradient
ascend phase and regards the scenario in which the current
message holder’s similarity to the target profile reaches the
flooding threshold (denoted as δ) as a successful delivery.
After the threshold is reached, the gradient ascend phase will
stop and it will start flooding the packet. The details about
profile-cast can be found in [1].
We will first observe how the performance, in terms of
delivery ratio and average transmission delay, will be affected
by introducing malicious nodes in this section. Then, our
credit-based scheme and reputation-based scheme will be
incorporated with the simulator to handle those misbehaving
nodes in profile-cast.
B. Misbehaving Node Parameters
We use three parameters to describe the malicious node
behaviors in profile-cast:
 Mobility trace files 
(Nov. 2007 USC) 
Association Matrix 
S Matrix V Matrix 
Parser 
Encounter traces 
Parser 
Singular Value 
Decomposition 
Profile-cast 
Simulator 
Target profiles 
Malicious node 
infomation 
Results 
Fig. 1. Overview of profile-cast simulation.
1) Percentage of malicious nodes in all the nodes (P1): We
vary the number of malicious nodes in the network from
0% to 100% in one step of 10%. With 0%, it means there
is no malicious node while 100% means all the nodes
will misbehave with a certain possibility during gradient
ascend phase of profile-cast.
2) Lower bound of the randomly generated possibility that
one malicious node will actually misbehave during a
packet transmission (P2): For each malicious node, it
does not always misbehave when a packet is sent to it.
In order to model the realistic scenario where malicious
node will only misbehave under certain circumstances
(e.g. low battery), we use a randomly generated possibil-
ity to measure the chance by which the malicious nodes
will actually misbehave. P2 acts as the lower bound
(the upper bound is 100%) of this randomly generated
possibility and varies from 0% to 100% in one step of
10%.
3) Threshold of the similarity to target profile lower than
which the malicious node will misbehave (P3): We
assume that malicious nodes tend to drop the packet
with a target profile dissimilar to themselves. In other
words, if the target profile is similar enough to itself,
the misbehaving node will forward the packet instead
of dropping it. P3 acts as this similarity threshold for
making the forwarding decisions and ranges from 10%
to δ in one step of 10%. Note that δ is the flooding
threshold in profile-cast.
Clearly, these three parameters will affect the performance
of profile-cast, as shown by our experiment results in next
section.
C. Results
We have used USC November 2007 traces from access
points. Which had originally 135 access points and more than
32000 unique MAC ids. At first we filtered some MAC ids
based on regularity criteria, i.e. we chose only those MAC
ids who logged in more than 40 times in a month or there
cumulated log in duration was above a threshold. In this
way we identified 3426 unique nodes. For ease of illustration
purpose, we randomly generated 1000 packets which are all
able to be transmitted to the destination in the original profile-
cast. In other words, if there is no malicious node, the delivery
ratio is 100%. The flooding threshold δ is set to 80%.
We investigate the impact on delivery ratio from varying the
three parameters described in Section IV-B. Since no misbe-
havior handling scheme is employed, which means the packet
transmission terminates whenever the packet gets dropped,
average delay or number of hops is not relevant thus not shows
here2.
1) Varying Number of Malicious Nodes: We set the mis-
behaving possibility lower bound (P2) and the similarity
threshold of misbehaving (P3) to 50% and 20%, respectively.
Figure 2 shows the result. I can be observed that, as expect,
misbehaving nodes will have severe impact on profile-cast’s
performance. 10% of malicious nodes will lead to 17% packet
transmission failures (delivery ratio of 83%). If all the nodes
are malicious nodes (with misbehaving possibilities randomly
generated within [50%,100%]), the delivery ratio drops below
30%.
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Fig. 2. Impact on delivery ratio from malicious nodes.
2) Varying Misbehaving Possibility Lower Bound: In the
next set of experiments, we vary P2 as described above. P1
and P3 are set to 30% and 40%, respectively. As shown in
Figure 3, when each malicious node has higher chance to
actually misbehave at runtime, the delivery ratio will decrease.
Note that, however, the degradation is not as drastic as from the
number of malicious nodes since P2 acts as the lower bound
of the misbehaving possibility.
3) Varying Similarity Threshold of Misbehaving: We also
investigate the impact on delivery ratio from various similarity
threshold to the target profile lower than which the malicious
node will misbehave (P3). With P1 and P2 having a value of
40% and 50%, Figure 4 demonstrates this affect. We observe
that higher misbehaving threshold will lead to lower delivery
ratio since malicious node will drop the packet more likely
2In fact, they are actually decreasing with increasing number of malicious
nodes due to early-terminated packet transmissions.
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Fig. 3. Impact on delivery ratio from varying misbehaving possibility lower
bound.
(i.e. its similarity to the target is lower than the threshold). The
degradation in delivery ratio is especially significant when P3
drops from 10% to 30% since it causes most of the packets
being dropped during the every early stage of gradient ascend
when the packet holder’s similarity is low.
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Fig. 4. Impact on delivery ratio from varying similarity threshold of
misbehaving.
V. A SIMPLE APPROACH – RETRANSMISSION
The most intuitive approach to handle malicious nodes in
profile-cast is to employ a retransmission scheme. In other
words, the current packet holder retransmit the packet to the
next encountered node whenever it detects that the last node
it sent to misbehaves and drops the packet. Retransmission,
clearly, requires certain assumption that each node is able to
detect the misbehaviors on its next hop. We feel that it is
reasonable in profile-cast since the packet transmission only
happens when the two nodes are in the same location (AP).
Therefore, we could let the node which receives the packet
send an acknowledgement to the sender when it decides to
forward the packet. We further assume that misbehaving nodes
will not send any acknowledgement. This makes it possible for
the sender to setup a timer and reselect the next-hop node again
whenever there is a timeout. The process continues until the
current packet holder receives the acknowledgement indicating
that the packet will get transmitted.
Since malicious nodes do not misbehave all the time, it is
possible that it will forward the packet normally in the next
encounter with the sender. Therefore, initially, we do not block
the malicious node which drops the packet. In other words,
if the next encountered node is the same malicious node, the
sender will still try to forward the packet to it. We first look at
the effect of using retransmission without isolating malicious
nodes, after which we will examine whether it is beneficial to
block malicious nodes.
Figure 5 illustrates that retransmission is able to improve the
delivery ratio significantly. We vary the number of malicious
nodes (P1) and set P2 and P3 to 80% and 60%, respectively.
The timer’s length is set to 1000 seconds. It can be observed
that the delivery ratio is increased absolutely by 45%. How-
ever, on the other hand, as shown in Figure 6, the average
delay due to retransmission is also increased significantly by
1.5 times on average. Clearly, it is a tradeoff which has to
be made by the designer between delivery ratio and average
delay.
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Fig. 5. Delivery ratio improvement using retransmission.
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Fig. 6. Average delay increasing using retransmission.
In order to be consistent with the results of other ap-
proaches, we also looked at the impact on delivery ratio
of using retransmission for 3000 randomly generated target
profiles. Note that in this 3000 experiments, not all packets
will get delivered in the scenario where no malicious node
exists. P2 and P3 are also set to 80% and 60%, respectively.
In case of using retransmission, we compare the results
between the scenarios where the malicious nodes are blocked
or not. As shown in Figure 9, blocking out malicious nodes
during gradient ascend phase show only very slight improve-
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Fig. 7. Delivery ratio improvement using retransmission (3000 experiments).
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Fig. 8. Average delay increasing using retransmission (3000 experiments).
ment in terms of delivery ratio. We believe it is due to the fact
that the next node encountered (other than the malicious node
who drops the packet) could also be a malicious node while the
detected malicious node could possibly behave normally in its
next encounter with the sender. The average delay, as shown
in Figure 10, shows unpredictable pattern between these two
scenarios, since blocking out malicious node does not have
any impact on delay.
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Fig. 9. Delivery ratio comparison with/without malicious blocking.
VI. CREDIT BASED POLICING OF MALICIOUS NODES
Credit based system for monitoring malicious nodes in an
ad-hoc network was used by [3], [11]. Each node has some
amount of credit, which is changed when it transmits or
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Fig. 10. Average delay comparison with/without malicious blocking.
forwards a packet. The basic philosophy for the credit-based
monitoring is as following.
1) When a node has its own packet to send, its credit gets
decreased by the number of hops required to reach the
destination. If the node does not have enough credit, it
can not transmit the packet.
2) When a node forwards someone else’s packet, its credit
gets increased.
3) The credit on each node is monitored by either a
centralized Credit Clearance Service (CCS) [3] or using
a tamper-proof hardware [11], which allocate and delete
credit from nodes as per rules.
This method effectively combats performance degradation
in presence of malicious nodes in the network. For example, if
a node acts maliciously for a long time and does not forward
any packet, effectively no credit will be gained by it. As a
result, when it wants to transmit its own packet, it will lack
enough credit to successfully accomplish that. Hence, the node
is forced to act normally and forward packets from others
until it has enough credit to transmit its own packet. We have
used the same scheme for Delay Tolerant Networks employing
Profile-Cast. It should be noted that the chief concern here is
the successful packet transmission ratio. In Section VI-B, we
have compared this credit-based approach with the original
scenario, where there are no monitoring of malicious nodes,
to show how the packet transmission success rate is enhanced
using this approach.
A. Challenges
As we have seen in Section VI, a node loses its credit when
it transmits a message. Let’s call this loss amount as creditth.
Yale et al.[3] proposed a quantitative measure of creditth as the
number of hops the packet from the sender takes to reach the
destination. An example illustrating this is shown in Figure 11.
Node 0 is the originating node, from where a packet gets
transmitted. The packet has to travel n hops before it reaches
Node n, which is the destination. It can be seen that the Node
0, because of its interest for transmission has to lose a credit of
n. On the other hand, the other nodes, which actively forward
the packet to reach the destination, gains 1 credit each.
However, a major difference of using this value of creditth
in Profile-Cast is that while Yale et al. [3] implemented their
Node 0 Node 1 Node 2 Node n
Credit−n Credit+1 Credit+1 Credit+1
Node n−1
Fig. 11. Credit based monitoring scheme
system in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks, Profile-Cast is in Delay-
Tolerant Networks(DTNs). In DTNs, it’s difficult to get a
pre-conceived estimate of how many hops will be needed to
route the packet finally to the destination. Hence, assigning
the initial value of creditth based on the number of hops is not
possible in this scenario. We have seen that in our experiments,
in average about 4 hops are necessary to transmit a packet
from the sender to the destination. Therefore, we have used
for creditth a constant value of 4 that dictates the amount of
credit loss when a node originates the transmission of a packet.
Variation of the successful transmission ratio with creditth is
shown in Section VI-B.
Yale et al. [3] have assumed a lot of misbehaving scenario
and proposed various solutions to them. These include collu-
sion between the sender and the receiver, dropping of receipt
and so on. For simplicity, we have neglected these scenario.
Our only concern are the malicious nodes in the network
that can drop packets based on the profile as described in
Section IV. Due to scalability issues, we have not used a
CCS (which was used by [3]) in our approach. Instead we
have used a tamper-proof hardware that was used by [11].
The tamper-proof hardware, present in each node, stores its
credit. The node can not, in any circumstances, modify the
contents of the hardware, hence the name. Therefore, the credit
check and updating is done in a distrbuted fashion inside each
node, and not in the centralized server. Taking all these into
consideration, we have devised our algorithm as shown in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Credit based monitoring of malicious nodes
if Node N wants to transmit a packet then
if CreditN < creditth then
Transmit the packet;
CreditN =CreditN− creditth;
end if
end if
if Node N forwards a packet then
CreditN =CreditN+1;
end if
The malicious node adopts a strategy for behaving when
this credit based scheme is applied. It has been seen from
prior discussions, that malicious nodes can either act properly
like any other normal nodes by forwarding packets, or can act
maliciously by dropping packets. In the former case, it does
not matter since the credit score gets increased. However, when
acting maliciously, it is losing its credit which it could have
gained by forwarding the packet. If the node continues to act
maliciously, it will not gain enough credits and hence, after
a certain time duration, the node will not have enough credit
to start its own transmission. To prevent that, the malicious
node, before misbehaving, check its credit value. If the credit
of the node is less than creditth, it does not misbehave, so that
it can regain its credit lost in transmission. The procedure is
shown in Algorithm 2
Algorithm 2 Behaviour of malicious nodes
if Node N is a malicious node then
if N does not act maliciously then
Forward the packet;
else
if CreditN < creditth then
Forward the packet;
else
Drop the packet;
end if
end if
end if
In Section VI-B, we have fixed the two parameters creditth
and the number of transmissions per experiment. Then, we
have explored how the introduction of malicious nodes affect
the success rate of transmission. Finally, we have compared
the credit-based approach with the retransmission scheme used
in Section V.
B. Experiments
For effective use of credit-based scheme in profile-cast,
we have modified the existing profile-cast simulator. In our
experiments, we deal with the traces obtained from USC for
the month of November 2007. Using the methods discussed
in Section IV-C, we have reduced the traces to 3426 unique
MAC addresses and 135 Access Points.
In order to implement the credit based approach in profile-
cast, we have to first fix the value of creditth3. As we have
discussed earlier, it has been seen that the messages take an
average of 4 hops to reach the destination. Therefore, the
value of creditth should be around 4. We have conducted
simulations with the creditth value varying from 3 to 5 in steps
of 1, that is, we have oscillated around the 4 value. Each of
these simulations have the same set of 3000 transmissions4.
The number of malicious nodes is kept fixed at 20% for all
the runs in this experiment. For all the experiments in this
section, including this one, the malicious node misbehaving
probability is kept between 80%-100%. The malicious node
similarity threshold, as described in Section IV-C have been
chosen as 60%. The flooding threshold is kept at 80%. The
results have been shown in Figure 12. It can be seen that after
the creditth value of 4, the performance improvement is very
less. Therefore, we have chosen a creditth value of 4 for our
next experiments.
In our next experiment, we vary the number of packets
transmitted for each simulation to see the effect of credit
based monitoring. We have varied the number of packets from
1000 to 3000 in steps of 1000. As before, we have assumed
presence of 20% malicious nodes. The other parameters, that
is, the malicious node misbehaving probability, the similarity
3This denotes the minimum credit limit, beneath which, a node cannot start
transmitting its packet
4These were randomly generated in the same way as described in Sec-
tion IV-C
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Fig. 12. Variation of Performance with creditth
and flooding threshold are kept at the same value as the last
experiment. The creditth value is kept fixed at 4. The results
have been shown in Figure 13. The Original column presents
the results when no form of monitoring is present on the
malicious nodes. We have used this convention for all the
figures in this section. It can be seen that our credit based
scheme gives an improvement in all cases, which is quite
expected. The maximum benefit is obtained when the number
of transmissions is 3000 and the improvement is found to be
about 26%. For the next experiment, we have used this value,
that is, 3000 transmissions so that the difference between the
two approaches become visible enough.
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Fig. 13. Comparison of Performance with variation in number of transmis-
sions
Now, we would like to explore the effect of credit based
system when the number of malicious nodes are varied.
Till now, all the experiments conducted had about 20% of
malicious nodes. We now increase the number of malicious
nodes from 10% to 100% in steps of 10%. The number of
transmissions is kept at 3000 and the value of creditth is
fixed at 4. As before, the other parameters are kept at the
same value as the last experiment. The results have been
shown in Figure 14. It can be seen that the improvement
obtained through credit based scheme tends to increase when
we enhance the number of malicious nodes, and it reaches
about 30% when there are 100% malicious nodes. The reason
is quite obvious. With more malicious nodes, the original
method5 shows a rapid decrease in performance, while for
the credit based scheme, the decrease is much less due to
the monitoring. Hence, the improvement, that is difference of
successful transmission percentages between the two is more.
5One without any monitoring
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Fig. 14. Comparison of Performance with variation in number of malicious
nodes
Now, we compare our results with the retransmission
scheme discussed in Section V. In this case, loss of packets are
being countered using retransmission, which should effectively
increase the successful transmission ratio. The results are
shown in Figure 15. We have assumed presence of 20%
malicious nodes and a creditth value of 4. The number of
transmissions are varied from 1000 to 3000 in steps of 1000.
As can be seen, the credit based scheme performs better than
simple retransmission in case of 2000 and 3000 transmissions.
However, for 1000 transmissions, it performs significantly
worse than the retransmission scheme. The reason for this can
be attributed to the fact that the credit based scheme takes
some time to mature since unless some malicious nodes have
actually lost credits by their own transmission, they will not
act properly. Hence, for small transmission frames of 1000,
retransmission schemes work better. The high delivery ratio
for the experiment with 1000 nodes is because these 1000
experiments have been chosen intentionally such that, if there
are no malicious nodes, the packets will definitely reach the
destination. That is, there will not be any packet loss due to
absence of similarity.
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Fig. 15. Comparison of performances between credit based and restransmis-
sion scheme
Thus, the credit based monitoring of malicious nodes pro-
vides a significant improvement over the original scheme,
where no monitoring was present. However, the additional
burden that this scheme has to carry is the extra cost and
overhead of the tamper-proof hardware, which monitors the
credit in a distributed fashion.
VII. AN APPROACH OF SELF POLICING IN BEHAVIORAL
AWARE NETWORK THROUGH REPUTATION
CSI: Target mode of profile cast has two main phases: a)
gradient ascend phase and b) group spread phase. In target
mode, during the initial phase of gradient ascend, there will be
very few nodes with very low profile matching. Since there are
very few nodes who at least have some kind of matching, the
sending node will have very less choice in-terms of selecting
the next sender and since the matching of profile is very less, it
is most likely that those nodes will not be very trust worthy as
they may not be interested/acquainted about the target profile
which the message is all about. On the other hand after the
message has crossed the threshold similarity, there is a group
spread phase and in this group spread phase the nodes carrying
the message are very similar to the target profile. That is we
can say that this message was targeted for them and based on
this reasoning we can assume, the chances that these nodes
within target profile will misbehave is extremely low and
therefore we can ignore.
This new approach of reputation based self policing mech-
anism is based on this above mentioned reasoning. It tries to
help the network learn about the presence of malicious nodes
and helps it to evolve so that the impact of such malicious
activities can be minimized during gradient ascend phase. This
mechanism takes help of nodes in the target profile (on the
boundary of the group spread phase to be specific) to gather
information about successful delivery of the packet.
A. Description of reputation based self policing mechanism
In this mechanism, the format of the message will be
augmented to incorporate a footer section in the message.
Each node will have an unique node ID,NID (similar to some
account number or email id) with exclusive access by the node.
During gradient ascend phase of profile cast, after finding a
node which is more similar than itself, the current message
holder node will at first, append its own unique NID in the
message footer and then deliver it to the new node. Thus
during subsequent delivery of the message, all NIDs of the
nodes who helped in carrying the packet will be appended
in the message footer section. When, at the end of gradient
ascend phase, the similarity of the nodes crosses a threshold
towards the target profile, the node located at that flooding or
group spread boundary will parse the message footer and send
an exclusive message specific acknowledgement(ACK) to each
of the NIDs present in the footer.
Here, for the sending of acknowledgements we are relying
on infrastructure network or the Internet. The assumption
being each node who has an NID, at certain point of time
in future will get associated with some access points (APs)
and download the ACK sent to its NID, by the node located
on the flooding boundary, for a particular message, Notice
that it has not been assumed that after each packet sent it will
immediately expect an ACK.
This ACK is very meaningful for the node, as it implies
that what ever path was chosen to deliver the message did not
have malicious nodes in it. On a local perspective, this ACK
means whichever neighbor it had chosen, based on similarity,
to deliver the packet is not malicious (at least for that type of
target profile).
Using this information, each node can maintain a table
about its neighbors who are trustworthy for a certain type
of profile. In this table the nodes will be classified based on
type target profiles and there will be various “levels of trust.
The neighbors who were not chosen to deliver a packet or
for whom no acknowledgement was received will not enter in
this table. There can be various levels of trusts, like if single
acknowledgement is received for a node the level of trust is
1, if after that more acknowledgements are received where
that node was again chosen as a sender, his trust value may
increase to 2 and then 4 and then 8 etc, up-to a certain value
after which it will be saturated and will be counted as most
trusted neighbor. There should be an aging mechanism like: if
for a very long time no ACK is received for a node then his
trust level will decrease gradually. This aging can be reasoned
as follows: although it was one of the most trusted nodes but
its current behavior is suspicious. This may happen if some
good node was compromised at later point of time, and this
aging process will help to avoid those nodes and incorporate
a dynamic nature in this trust mechanism. Based on the above
discussion the protocol of profile cast for choosing next node
can be modified as shown in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Modified Gradient Ascend
N = nearest neighbor in terms o f time
delivery f actor = 0
while delivery f actor < c4 do
if N.Similarity>ME.Similarity then
Pro f ile P= FIND PROFILE
if P.N.reputation= 8 then
Add to footer (ME.NID)
Deliver the message to N
delivery f actor = delivery f actor+ c1
else
if P.N.reputation>= 1 then
Add to footer (ME.NID)
Deliver the message to N
delivery f actor = delivery f actor+ c2
end if
else
Add to footer (ME.NID)
Deliver the message to N
delivery f actor = delivery f actor+ c3
end if
end if
N = another neighbor
end while
Here c1,c2,c3,c4 are constants and is used to specify how
many number of threads will be created or In other words
how many copies of the message will be given to neighbors
to avoid malicious activities. Certainly,
c4= c1> c2> c3
These numbers can either be found through simulations or
can be made as part of the learning process itself. Thus if
the current node does not find any neighbor who has a good
reputation, it will deliver more than one copies to its neighbors.
This reputation based scheme is certainly better than giving
more than one copies of the packet each time, in terms of
overhead because it tries to minimize the number of copies
of the message by trying to find a reputed node in its
neighborhood for that type of profile. Here node based on
profile is chosen as follows, when a new message is received,
its similarity is compared with previously received profiles
and if this similarity is higher than a threshold then reputed
nodes corresponding to that stored profile is considered. If
there is no match with stored profiles, then after receiving
the ACK corresponding to this message and corresponding to
the neighbor selected to deliver this message, a new entry is
created and this profile is saved and that node is also saved as
trusted node for this profile. The number of such entries in the
table can be constrained to avoid excessive storage overhead. It
is easy to see that this mechanism helps the nodes to gradually
learn about the network and about malicious activities. It tries
to classify trustworthy nodes based on profiles and therefore
handles both general malicious activities and profile based
malicious activities. Therefore this mechanism has a “learning
phase after which it is expected to perform better.
B. Simulation
For simulation, existing code for profile cast simulator was
modified. We have used USC November 2007 traces. The
methods described in Section IV-C and Section VI-B are used
to extract out 3426 unique MAC addresses and 135 APs.
Then we randomly marked 50% nodes as malicious with 10%
profile based misbehaving probability. Then we created 30
experiments where packets are transferred from source nodes
to randomly generated target profiles. The number of hops to
reach the target profile and the delay was noted. The plot of
those two parameters are shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17
respectively.
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Fig. 16. Comparison of Number of hops needed to reach the target profile
It can be seen as with increasing index of experiments the
network “learns” about presence of malicious nodes and tries
to avoid paths through them and thus number of hops and
delays get improved.
To measure how the delivery ratio decreases with percentage
of misbehaving nodes, another 10 set of 1000 experiments
were performed where percentage of misbehaving nodes were
varied from 1
One major drawback of this scheme is it relies on infras-
tructured network to send ACKs, although that is a reasonable
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Fig. 18. Comparison of delivery ratio
assumption in campus like scenario where each node can
be assumed to login at certain point of time and the profile
information about nodes were itself gathered through access
point traces. This draw back can be avoided in future work
where sending the ACKs back through the same route can be
judged. In general sending the ACKs back through the same
nodes is not a practical idea in DTN, but since in this case the
scenario is little bit different in the presence of theses profile
informations, this can be feasible. During gradient ascend
phase the packet got delivered to the target profile and this
implies two things
1) There was overlap between each consecutive nodes in
terms of profile and since these profiles are normally
periodic in nature, there is a finite chance of meeting
those nodes again at some point of time.
2) Since the packet was successfully delivered, this means
at least in that case nodes did not behave maliciously
for that message profile. So there is a chance that they
will also help in delivering the ACK back.
Some other schemes like Game Theoretic approach can be
employed here to make this reverse flow of ACK more robust.
VIII. GAME THEORITIC APPROACH
Previously Iterated Prisoners Dilemma and Genetic Algo-
rithm have been used in the papers by Komathy et al [12], [13]
and by Seredynski [14]. Our approach also adopts the strategy
which is most beneficial for optimizing its profit, which results
in forwarding the packets most of the time. Hence slowly the
malicious nodes evolve to become good nodes.
A. Classical Prisoner’s Dilemma
There are 2 criminals who are separately interrogated by
the police to own up to their crimes. Depending on whether
they chose to own up (defect) or keep silent (co-operate)
independently they are given a penalty depending on his action
and the action which is taken by the other criminal.
�����������Prisoner 1
Prisoner 2 Co-operate Defect
Co-operate 1 yr jail each Go free-10 yrs jail
Defect 10 yrs jail-Go free 1 yr jail each
TABLE I
OUTCOME ASSOCIATED WITH EACH ACTION OF THE PRISONER
N2 F
N3 F
N4 D
N5 F
TABLE II
FOR NODE 1: CONTAINS INFORMATION OF ALL OTHER NODES IN THE
SYSTEM
B. Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
If 2 players play the Prisoners Dilemma more than once
in succession then it is called Iterated Prisoners Dilemma.
To reach Nash Equilibrium (where no player can benefit by
changing his strategy given that the strategy adopted by the
other players is constant) is has been seen that the optimal
strategy is to play defect all the time.
C. Application of Prisoner’s dilemma to Profile-Cast
Each node will store 2 tables and a score. Table VIII-C has
information about the Forwarding or dropping action of all
the nodes in the system when it encountered them and wanted
the encountered node to forward its packets. Table VIII-C
contains information about all the other nodes in the system
and what forwarding or dropping decision it took when the
encountered node requested it for packet forwarding. Each
node in addition to these tables also stores a cumulative score
which is maintained over a duration of the total number of
experiments.
D. Assumptions
The assumptions we made are as follows.
1) The nodes are rational.
2) The system has a starting point where there is past
information of the tables.
3) The score of each node is initialized to 0.
4) Only one packet forwarding request is sent from the
Sender Node at a time.
5) We have not taken into consideration link characteristics
of the channel.
E. How the Tables and the Score is used
When a node receives a packet it either forwards the packet
or misbehaves. Based on the past action of the immediate
N2 D
N3 F
N4 F
N5 F
TABLE III
FOR NODE 2: CONTAINS INFORMATION OF ALL OTHER NODES IN THE
SYSTEM
������������Sender Node
Receipient Node
Forward(past) Drop(past)
Forward(present) 4-4 3-0
Drop(present) 0-3 1-1
TABLE IV
SHOWING SCORE ASSOCIATED WITH EACH ACTION OF THE NODES
sender of the packet and the current forwarding dropping
action of its own self it updates its score. The score updating
takes place according to Table VIII-E.
After the score updating next is the Table updating. Based
on the forwarding behavior of the Current Node, its own
Table VIII-C entry for Immediate Sender Node is updated.
Similarly Immediate Sender Nodes Table VIII-C entry for the
Current Node is updated based on its behavior. If the Current
Node forwards the packet the probability of it misbehaving
for the next time is decreased with the assumption that it
will always try to maximize its profit and try to adopt the
strategy which is the most beneficial to it, i.e. the forwarding
strategy. Also assuming that the probability of malicious
or selfish node misbehavior is being decreased with each
forwarding action it can be shown that after a sufficiently
large number of experiments the throughput of the network
improves considerably.
F. Strength and Weakness of the scheme
The strengths of the scheme are as follows.
1) It is scalable since only 2n information is being stored
in the tables of each node.
2) The score is updated based on the basis of receiving or
not receiving acknowledgements from the recipient, and
is dependent on only one hop.
3) No node is isolated; Hence Bad nodes can also send and
forward packets.
4) The malicious nodes evolve over time, since selfishness
does not prove to be optimal, i.e. Nash Equilibrium can
be reached if each node constantly forwards packets.
The weakness of the scheme is that it does not take into
consideration the link characteristics. Hence if a node is
dropped due to a noisy channel, the score and tables are
updated erroneously. However this does not provide any wrong
information about the probability of the node misbehaving.
G. Results
We have conducted results on the USC traces for the month
of November 2007, using 3000 transmissions. In the following
two experiments, we want to notice the variation of delivery
ratio with malicious nodes. For the first experiment in this
section, including this one, the malicious node misbehaving
probability is kept between 10%-100%. The malicious node
similarity threshold, as described in Section IV-C have been
chosen as 50%. The flooding threshold is kept at 60%. The
results are shown in Figure 19.
In the next experiment, the malicious node misbehaving
probability is kept between 80%-100%. The malicious node
similarity threshold, as described in Section IV-C have been
chosen as 60%. The flooding threshold is kept at 80%. The
results are shown in Section 20.
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Fig. 20. Variation of Delivery ratio with the variation of malicious nodes
3 parameters have been varied for the 2 graphs. It shows that
in majority of the cases the game-theoretic approach gives a
better delivery ratio than the profile cast without self-policing.
It can be inferred that if the number of experiments is more
than 4000 the actual leap in performance can be experienced.
Since here the number of unique nodes is 3426, while the
number of experiments is just 3000. The improvement is not
instantaneous as the network requires a long duration to reach
a state of optimum performance where all nodes co-operate.
There are a few deviation where the normal scenario shows
better performance, This reason can be attributed to the fact
that the path chosen by the packets select more good nodes
than the game theoretic approach, or the selfish nodes do not
misbehave in that particular experiment.
IX. FUTURE WORK
For future work, we plan to investigate more alternatives for
handling malicious nodes in behavior-aware mobile networks.
For example, we can use multiple message copies in the
network. Therefore, there will be multiple threads during the
gradient phase instead of only one. In other words, duplication
can be used to trade for performance and robustness. More
subtle and well-tuned game-theory based approach is also
worth the effort to investigate.
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